A strategy without a theory
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with the responsibility of "build[ing] a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the Nation's Critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency."
i The homeland security strategy is considered all-hazards because it embraces both natural and human-made catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina, and the 9/11 Terrorist attacks.
The effective implementation of the all-hazards strategy hinges upon our understanding of catastrophes: earthquakes and wild fires in Southern California; hurricanes in Florida;
terrorist attacks on infrastructure; and pandemic threats such as the H1N1 influenza.
Unfortunately, there has been no unifying theory of catastrophe to guide decisionmaking, preparedness, or response. We do not know, for example, why some catastrophes are "worse" than others, or if the rate of catastrophes is increasing or decreasing. Moreover, we do not know what properties of a human or natural system contribute to fragility or resilience.
This lack of understanding has led to organizational confusion (what is the goal?), duplication of effort (different agencies doing the same thing), and poor utilization of limited resources (inadequate identification of the most at-risk assets, maximal return on investment, and resourcing of adequate response capability). DHS has adopted a riskinformed decision-making process, but has done so without defining key terms such as "risk" or quantifying the primary elements of risk: "threat", "vulnerability", "resilience", and "consequence" -terms used throughout DHS policy and strategy documents. Riskinformed decisions are difficult to make without operational definitions of risk and resiliency! For example, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets ii recommends, "the first objective of this strategy is to identify and assure the protection of those assets, systems, and functions that we deem most 'critical' in terms of national-level public health and safety, governance, economic and national security, and public confidence. We must develop a comprehensive, prioritized assessment of facilities, systems, and functions of national-level criticality and monitor their preparedness across infrastructure sectors." This is a laudable objective, but since 2003 DHS has not been able to define 'critical', 'prioritization', or 'preparedness' -definitions that are badly needed before setting a course of action and allocating precious resources. The authors claim this malady will continue to persist until a suitable theory of catastrophe is developed and turned into practice.
We propose a theory of all-hazards catastrophe, the results of which can be used to guide policy decisions for homeland security. Our theory is based on network science iii,iv,v,vi,vii and normal accident theory. viii In a related approach, Ramo ix borrows on ideas taken from physical science to explain how political disasters happen. Ramo's ideas were previously explored and illustrated by Buchanan in a broader context. x Similarly, Taleb's highly popular book on randomness xi lays the foundation for some of the ideas expressed in the author's theory of catastrophe xii -specifically addressing the claim that many catastrophes are the result of random processes, rather than deterministic cause-andeffects. While Taleb focuses on "black swans" -highly unlikely, highly consequential, unpredictable events, we argue that black swans are statistically predictable and follow a power law exceedence probability distribution. Lewis 34 applied the theory of complex systems to critical infrastructure and showed the relationship between power laws, black swans, and normal accident theory to critical infrastructure systems. Thus, power laws appear to be fundamental to catastrophe theory, which raises the question of "why"? Our answer: catastrophic events, including black swans, are normal accidents that increase with increasing self-organization.
Normal accidents
The authors claim that natural and human-caused catastrophes are a byproduct of routine complex system behaviors, which, ironically, contain the seeds of their own destruction. 
Risk, resiliency, and networks
Resiliency -a property of complex systems that makes them more or less tolerant of faults -may be explained by network analysis. The Network's mapping function is key to understanding the relationship between the BTW and SOC properties of the grid, and SOC is key to understanding resiliency. Specifically, it turns out that the spread or 'cascade' to other nodes in the network from a single node or link failure is magnified by self-organized criticality (SOC). The higher SOC is, the larger the effect of a cascade failure. We show that this criticality is associated with the exponent of a power law fit to the exceedance probability curve for fault consequences associated with the network. We ran computer simulations of network failures by disabling a random node in the network shown in Figure 1 . We propagated that failure to neighboring nodes using a 25%
probability that any node linked directly to a failed node would, in turn, fail. Counting the number of disabled nodes for each such simulation and dividing by the total number of nodes in the network produced a measure of failure consequence. Consequence percentages were tabulated for each of 10,000 computer simulations and used to construct a fault histogram. We constructed the exceedance probability, Figure 2 , from those data, as follows:
1. Rank the n consequences from greatest to least.
2. Calculate the exceedance probability, EP, using: Figure 2 shows the exceedance probability plot of the simulated consequences of an attack on the Mid-Atlantic power grid shown in Figure 1 . These data are well described by a power-law fit. In this plot, the exceedance probability obeys a power law: EP(x ≥ c) ~ x -q , where x and c are a measure of consequences, and q is the exponent of a leastsquares fit to the data. We call q the resilience exponent, or simply 'resilience'. The larger q is, the higher the resilience is, because the tail of the exceedence probability distribution decreases with increasing q. In the limit, a very high q implies a very low consequence. Table I lists a variety of typical natural and human-caused catastrophes along with the exponents, q, extracted from power-law fits of the exceedance probability for each. Power laws appear to be an integral part of catastrophe theory!
We define the probable maximum loss risk as R = xEP(x). xx Then it is clear that R is bounded as x increases, for q ≥ 1; and unbounded for q < 1, because R ~ x (1-q) . Thus, the hazards in Table I can be divided into two categories: low-risk and high-risk, depending on the value of q. Using this definition for resilience allows one to clearly relate resilience to risk: resilient systems are low risk while 'non-resilient' systems are high risk. That is, catastrophes are either low-or high-risk depending on their resiliency exponent, q.
Though this approach allows one to classify the hazard as resilient or not, it does not explain why the resiliency exponent, q, differs for different kinds of hazards. We propose that the resiliency exponent, q, when derived from consequences associated with networked systems, is directly related to the topology of those networked systems. We illustrate this using additional simulations of various hazardous phenomena of interest to homeland security.
Self-organized criticality in networks
The authors claim that the resilience exponent, q, varies for different (network) systems because of the topologies of those systems. We tested this claim by simulating the propagation of a single-node failure throughout both random and scale-free networks over a range of average link density, shown in Figure 3 . In our simulations, failure spreads to adjacent nodes, through links, with constant probability, p f , (where, in this case p f = 25%). Consequence was calculated after each of 10,000 incidents, by recording the number of nodes affected by the propagated fault. The recorded consequences were placed into bins of increments of 1% each, tallied at the end of the simulation, and converted into an exceedence probability plot, EP(x). Finally, resilience, q, was obtained by fitting a power law to EP(x).
The experiment varied two properties of networks: the density of links, and the degree sequence distribution of each network. In Figure 3 , link density was varied from a mean of 2 to 6 links per node for both a randomly linked network and a scale-free network.
This plot shows that the resiliency exponent, q, decreased exponentially with increasing link density for both random and scale-free networks That is, networks with a higher density of links suffer greater loss due to link percolation. xxi Put more simply, the number of adjacent nodes that would fail is directly related to the number of links, n, times the probability of failure of a node, p f , or np f . Clearly, the more highly linked a network is, the greater the failure consequence. Link density (percolation) increases SOC, rendering the network less resilient. counterparts. This is because of the highly connected hub, which transmits failures through more links. "Hubness" is another form of self-organized criticality that may explain why q differs for different systems. Resilience exponents can be computed for each infrastructure and compared against our low-and high-risk threshold. These simulations of real-world networks suggest that catastrophe is a combination of self-organized criticality, random incidents, and selfsimilar system architecture. This confirms the work by others. For example, the AmaralMeyer network described by Buchanan xxii illustrates the impact of criticality in a dynamically evolving connected system, whereby catastrophic failure is intrinsic to the system. Dynamic network systems can fail without any outside influence, simply by reconfiguring themselves into critical states.
These simulations also support Perrow's normal accident theory. SOC is the "invisible coupling" described by Perrow and further elucidated by Lewis 34 . Perrow's normal accident theory predicts that black swan catastrophes occur whenever a series of forcemultiplying accidents unpredictably align themselves to bring down the entire system.
Many of these systems obey a power law when plotting exceedence probability versus consequence.
The authors claim that financial system meltdowns, earthquakes, power grid blackouts, and epidemics are largely the result of random small failures in systems that are in a state of self-organized criticality, SOC. Alarmingly, many of our critical infrastructure sectors have reached self-organized criticality. xxiii,xxiv Typical signs of SOC include link density, large hubs, and betweeness (number of paths running through a node). Overly connected nodes are found in the public switched telecommunications network, high betweeness in near-capacity tie lines in the power grid, congestion on highways, lack of surge capacity in hospitals, and viruses worming their way through the Internet. 
Application to cyber security
Does the forgoing theory of infrastructure as complex emergent systems apply to cyber security? Self-organized criticality, if it is present in networked computer systems such as the Internet, will manifest in the form of highly connected nodes (servers, autonomous systems), power law-shaped probability curves, or black swan incidents -rare, unpredictable, and high-consequence "accidents". The authors provide an initial, but perhaps incomplete, test of this hypothesis: the Internet and its corresponding infrastructure exhibits traits of a complex emergent system with self-organized criticality.
It is a high-risk infrastructure, because of its exceedence probability "signature", and its high susceptibility to exploits.
For example, the Internet's web graph has been shown to be scale-free (containing major hubs) by many researchers over the past decade 35, 36 . This form of self-organized criticality contributes to its vulnerability. Additionally, the underlying telecommunication infrastructure in the US is organized around a small number of very large and critical carrier or telecom hotels 25 . These are critical to the continuity of operation of the communications backbone of the nation. The black swan event -often called the "Pearl
Harbor of cyber" -has yet to happen, but its possibility cannot be ignored.
The data of Figure 4 shows the impact of cyber exploits for a one-month period during 2011. It follows the familiar power law characteristic of normal accidents and sand pile behavior. Figure 5 shows that the time interval between subsequent Distributed Denial of Attack (DDOS) exploits also obey a power law. Apparently, DDOS exploits are Levy
Flights -another characteristic of sand pile behavior. These "signatures" are familiar markers of complex systems.
While the data cited here is not conclusive, it does provide a preliminary verification of the theory proposed here: that infrastructures ranging from power grids to the Internet are subject to sand pile effects. Surprising adherence to power laws, and network properties found in many self-organized systems are also present in cyber systems. The proposed theory is slowly being validated by current cyber events, but more data is needed to complete the claim.
A strategy backed up by a theory
A scientifically sound theory of catastrophe is now available for policy-makers to enable risk-informed decision-making by the department of homeland security. Rather than spending billions of dollars on securing already resilient systems, the nation's treasury should be used to increase the resiliency of high-risk sectors such as telecommunications, electric power transmission and distribution, the financial sector, and fragile public health networks. One can relate the growth of infrastructure to the growth of sand piles. When small, the infrastructure systems grow somewhat stably. However, the system will eventually reach a critical state where the addition of new demands gives rise to unpredictable consequences.
Several mechanisms can be used to reverse self-organized criticality. Of course, the problem can be solved at the engineering level: addition of surge capacity, operating systems below maximum capacity, and restructuring networks to back them away from SOC. That is, operating these systems inefficiently will keep them from becoming critical! Each of these solutions has corresponding costs, however, and is the subject of another paper. A more global solution is to change regulatory policy, affecting infrastructures across the entire nation. Re-design of regulation is a better approach because it spreads the economic burden across an entire industry.
For example, the electric power grid has evolved into a state of self-organized criticality by incremental patching of its transmission network. Regulatory policies that motivate utilities to build more transmission capacity or promote local distributed generation (reducing the need for transmission capacity) would back the sector away from criticality.
A similar criticality exists in the communications sector due to the rise of telecommunications hotels. xxv The existence of telecom hotel hubs is a direct consequence of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that advocates peering among competitors and promotes co-location of switching equipment. This regulation needs to be changed, immediately, before a normal accident results in a national telecommunications blackout.
Similar self-organized criticalities exist in other infrastructure sectors. Financial systems tend to self-organize into criticality; public health/hospital systems have inadequate surge capacity; the World Wide Web/Internet is notoriously near its critical point with respect to denial of service attacks, worms, and cyber threats. Complex systems -whether they are financial, political, physical, human or naturally occurring -can be modeled as a network, where nodes are components and connections and relationships are links.
Normal systems are rational, well designed, and perform their functions perfectly over long periods of time and under a variety of stresses. Collapse of such systems comes as a shock, not because of attacks or unnatural events, but because of connectivity and randomly occurring small accidents that, occasionally, propagate and magnify throughout the system. We should not be surprised by normal accidents. Instead we should reduce their consequences by restructuring critical infrastructure networks to raise their resiliency exponent. 
